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CUTBACKS VS. PERFORMANCESTAT: WHAT=S THE CONFLICT? 
FINANCIAL DEFICITS AND ATTENTION DEFICITS 
Robert D. Behn 
ABSTRACT 
Reductions in any organization’s financial budget can cause reductions in the organiza-
tion’s performance (its outputs and outcomes).  It is not obvious, however, that the pri-
mary cause will be direct:  Less money to spend means less can be done.  Instead, the 
bigger impact may come through the opportunity costs created by the financial cuts on 
the time budget of the members of the leadership team.  For the attention that they must 
pay to any budget reductions automatically reduces the attention that they can devote 
performance improvements — and to everything else.  It isn’t the financial cuts them-
selves.  Rather, it is that the deficit in the financial budget creates a deficit in the lead-
ership team’s time budget.  The funding deficit in the financial budget imposes an atten-
tion deficit in the time budget. 
Keywords - Attention Deficit, Financial Deficit, Leadership, Performance Deficit, Per-
formanceStat 
INTRODUCTION 
AIn a world where attention is a major scarce resource, 
information may be an expensive luxury, for it may 
turn our attention from what is important to what is un-
important.@ 
Herbert A. Simon (1978, 13) 
PerformanceStat is a leadership strategy for improving performance. It is the leadership 
strategy employed at the New York City Police Department by William Bratton and 
Jack Maple when, in 1994, they created the original CompStat. It is the leadership strat-
egy employed by Baltimore’s Mayor Martin O’Malley when, in 2001, he created 
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CitiStat, adapting the strategy for an entire governmental jurisdiction. It is the leader-
ship strategy that has been adapted by a variety of public executives who have created 
their own AgencyStat. It is the leadership strategy that has been adapted by a variety of 
mayors, county executives, and governors who have created their own JurisdictionStat. 
PerformanceStat isn’t the only strategy for improving performance. As the definition 
suggests, however, it does contain the basic leadership and management behaviors re-
quired (in most public organizations, at least) to produce better results: 
A jurisdiction or agency is employing a PerformanceStat leadership strategy if, in 
an effort to achieve specific public purposes, its leadership team persists in hold-
ing an ongoing series of regular, frequent, integrated meetings during which the 
chief executive and/or the principal members of the chief executive’s leadership 
team plus the director (and the top managers) of different subunits use current da-
ta to analyze specific, previously defined aspects of each unit’s recent perfor-
mance; to provide feedback on recent progress compared with targets; to follow-
up on previous decisions and commitments to produce results; to examine and 
learn from each unit’s efforts to improve performance; to identify and solve per-
formance-deficit problems; and to set and achieve the next performance targets 
(Behn, forthcoming 2014). 
Despite its reputation for helping public organizations produce better results, Perfor-
manceStat has not be adopted universally throughout the public sector. Yes, most big-
city police departments in the United States have chosen to employ CompStat (Weis-
burd, et al., 2004) as have all of the state police departments in Australia. And numerous 
U.S. cities have created their own CitiStat. And, yes, most public executives publicly 
salute the call to improve performance and produce results. Still, despite the attention, 
most public executives have failed to adopt the PerformanceStat approach or to create 
their own performance leadership strategy. And some of those who do create their own 
AgencyStat or JurisdictionStat lose interest, permitting their initiative to atrophy and 
(eventually) disappear. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS TO PERFORMANCE LEADERSHIP 
Although this definition of PerformanceStat is long and complex (suggesting that, to be 
effective, the organization=s leadership team must engage in a variety of behaviors1), it 
is not that constraining. The leadership team has a lot of flexibility in deciding what 
performance deficits to attack, what data to collect, what targets to set, what meetings to 
hold, what feedback and follow-up to employ. Still, this definition does suggest that 
merely collecting some data and publishing it on a dashboard is not enough. Neither is 
complying with the provisions of the Government Performance and Results Moderniza-
tion Act of 2010 requiring all agencies in the U.S. government to conduct quarterly per-
formance reviews. After all, the letter (though certainly not the spirit) of this require-
ment can be satisfied by holding a series of show-and-tell meetings. Any public agency 
that fails to identify its performance deficits, or neglects to specify any performance 
targets, or disregards the importance of follow-up on past decisions and commitments is 
missing the opportunity to exploit the PerformanceStat potential. 
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Given all of the political rhetoric about the need for government organizations to im-
prove performance, why haven=t more public executives created their own Perfor-
manceStat? If public executives really want to improve performance, why haven=t they 
invented their own strategy for performance leadership?2 
Unfortunately, as the definition PerformanceStat suggests, improving performance is 
difficult. The organization=s leadership team has to engage in a variety of complex and 
interrelated behaviors. Improving performance is significantly more complicated than 
getting an organization to implement a new system – be this a new IT system, or a new 
personnel system, or a new accounting system. For such a new system is well specified; 
specific people have to do specific tasks in a specific order, in a specific way. All very 
specific. 
People, of course, will resist these new specifications. Everyone hates change. They 
have to determine when they are supposed to do what, requiring them to restructure 
their daily routine. Some will even try to subvert the new system. But the specificity of 
the Asystem@ provides a way to determine whether or not it has been implemented faith-
fully. 
Unfortunately, there is no Asystem@ for performance leadership. The PerformanceStat 
approach involves a variety of leadership behaviors that the leadership team must adapt 
to their particular purposes and to the particular characteristics of their organization. 
Moreover, the leadership team must adapt these behaviors to eliminate or mitigate the 
performance deficits that are inhibiting its ability to accomplish its purposes. Unfortu-
nately, there is no system for selecting the performance deficits that deserve to be fixed 
first. Choosing this is a leadership responsibility for which there is no formula. Sorry. 
Thus, it is not particularly surprising that many public executives do not make a signifi-
cant commitment to improving performance. They may proclaim that they are going to 
improve performance, but not until . . . . Here are several explanations (excuses) that 
public executives might employ – either explicitly when trying to decide whether or not 
to create their own PerformanceStat, or implicitly when dismissing it as something not 
worth doing: 
1. First, I have to focus on policy – on getting the policies right. Others (my suc-
cessors) will then have the opportunity to focus on the trivial task of imple-
menting my (brilliant) policies to achieve the better results that I desire. 
2. First, I have to recruit a better team. I can=t employ a PerformanceStat strategy 
with my current staff. They aren=t smart enough; they aren=t competent 
enough; they aren=t dedicated enough. 
3. First, I have to ensure that my organization can do the basics. Before my or-
ganization can improve performance, it needs to improve its operational com-
petence to be able to implement its standard policies and procedures. Only 
then can we move up to producing better results. 
The list of possible explanations (excuses) is quite long. Indeed, it also includes the 
simply assertion: 
Cutbacks vs. PerformanceStat: What=s the Conflict? Financial Deficits and Attention Deficits 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 14, Iss. 2, 2013 
 www.ipmr.net  4 
 
IPMR
N. I don=t have to worry about producing better results. Performance is not a prob-
lem. My organization is doing quite fine. 
Indeed, there are a host of practical, political, and managerial explanations why more 
public organizations – agencies or jurisdictions – do not employ PerformanceStat or 
other strategies of performance leadership (Behn 2002). 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO PERFORMANCE LEADERSHIP 
Moreover, there are a host of psychological reasons why more public executives do not 
employ the PerformanceStat leadership strategy. For one, the explicit use of perfor-
mance measures can expose an organization and its leadership (Smith 1995; Julnes and 
Holzer, 2001; McGinnes and Elandy, 2012). Why would smart public executives create 
the opportunity for others to criticize them and their organization by telling the world 
that their results are not perfect? 
An additional psychological barrier is that any focus on producing results conflicts with 
the traditional focus on following the rules. Whether the leadership team of an organiza-
tion is employing the PerformanceStat leadership strategy or some other approach to 
producing results, it is requiring everyone in the organization – including themselves – 
to think differently. They have to think differently about their individual responsibilities 
and about their collective responsibilities. They have all mastered rule-driven govern-
ment; they know how to make it work, how to abide by the regulations imposed by var-
ious overhead agencies (including which regulations are most important), and how to 
satisfy the various accountability holders. In short, they have learned how to stay out of 
trouble by following the rules that state exactly what to do and (even more importantly) 
what not to do. They have become quite expert at rule-driven government (Behn, 2002). 
If, however, the leadership team decides it should improve performance, everyone has 
to learn to function within a new and different set of standards. And the standards of 
results-driven government are qualitatively different from those of rule-driven govern-
ment. Results-driven government requires a thorough, philosophical and psychological, 
reorientation. For while the rules still exist – public employees still can=t steal money or 
hire their cousins – the real test of their and their organization=s value is whether or not 
they can produce improved results. 
But what results? Who gets to pick the results? Who decides what results the organiza-
tion will pursue, how to measure progress, and what counts as significant progress? If 
the legislature has already made these decisions, executive-branch managers don=t have 
to think this through. More likely, the legislature has avoided the difficult task of choos-
ing the purposes, results, measures, and targets. After all, such choices, while making 
some people happy, will also make some people unhappy – perhaps very unhappy. 
These choices will annoy those constituents whose priorities are at the bottom of the list 
(or not even on the list). Little wonder that legislators tell the executives that they 
should do the choosing.3 
Thus PerformanceStat or any true form of performance leadership requires public exec-
utives to choose purpose, results, measures, and targets. Further, it requires them to de-
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velop a strategy for hitting these targets, producing these results, and achieving these 
purposes. And given that the leadership team must function in its own, unique organiza-
tion and political environment, the cannot merely copy the performance strategy suc-
cessfully employed elsewhere. They can learn from other organizations, even very dis-
similar organizations. But this requires them to be capable of learning the tacit 
knowledge that successful organizations have acquired. Moreover, this requires them to 
be able to adapt these lessons to their own environment. They can=t copy. They have to 
learn and adapt. 
Finally, they have to avoid the temptation to propose a series of policy changes, which 
can be instituted relatively quickly, while promising that the results produced by these 
new policies will, sometime in the future, become visible. 
THE ABSOLUTE AND UNBENDABLE RESOURCE CONSTRAINT: THE TIME BUDGET 
All of these explanations reflect the fundamental resource constraint that faces every 
public executive. All humans, not just public executives, must work within this most 
absolute and unbendable resource limit. It is the limit in every person=s Atime budget@: 
the 168 hours in the week. 
Public executive can=t do everything. They have to choose on which purposes, prob-
lems, and challenges to focus and thus (if only implicitly) which to ignore.4 Thus, if a 
public executive is not being pressed to produce better results – either by executive-
branch superiors, by legislators, by citizens, by constituent organizations, or by crusad-
ers (journalists or advocacy organizations) – they will focus on other tasks. They will 
choose tasks in which they are more interested, tasks that they know how to do, tasks 
for which there exists a well-organized and influential constituency, tasks that the elect-
ed executive wants done or the legislature mandates. 
Some public executives will decide for themselves that producing better results is their 
primary purpose. They will create their own PerformanceStat not because they are di-
rectly pressured to improve performance, but because they want to improve perfor-
mance. This will be a personal decision – and a professional decision. These executives 
have decided that, each week, they will allocate a significant proportion of their 168 
hours to producing results. 
Such a professional decision will be based on a number of factors – including the need 
to improve performance, the ability of being able to make a significant improvement in 
performance, plus a strategy and other resources (particularly talent) for doing so. This 
is a professional judgment – a balancing of the individual=s professional objectives with 
all of the other demands that will not go away. And given the plethora and diversity of 
these other demands, deciding not take on the performance challenge can be a defensi-
ble decision. 
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PERFORMANCESTAT UNDER THE UBIQUITOUS FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
The time budget has a big disadvantage. It can never increase. No public executive has 
ever figured out how to increase his or her time budget to 169 hours in the week. Of 
course, the time budget also comes with a big advantage. It can never be cut. No interest 
group can mobilize a constituency movement that will (somehow) reduce an executive=s 
week to 167 hours, though they can be a big enough pain to force a reallocation of the 
168. Every week, every budget executive is guaranteed 168 hours (though some must 
allocate more of these hours to sleep than do others). 
In contrast, financial budgets go up, and financial budgets go down. They do this in re-
sponse, in part, to the business cycle. They also do this in response to the political cycle. 
When budgets do go up, few public executives complain. When, however, budget cuts 
hit, they make the public executive=s job much more difficult. For decremental budget-
ing is qualitatively different from incremental budgeting – and much more challenging 
(Behn 1985)5. 
Yet, even when revenues are not going down, public executives always face financial 
constraints. They never have the funding necessary to satisfy every request from indi-
vidual citizens and every demand from advocacy organizations. Public executives are 
constantly pressured to launch new initiatives, to propose new policies, to create new 
programs, to expand existing programs, to achieve new performance targets. They can=t 
do everything. They never have enough funding. Public executives must always decide 
what they will do – and, in the process, what they will not do. 
If the only real obstacle that was deterring public executives from creating their own 
PerformanceStat (or some other performance leadership approach) was a budget con-
straint, why did not more of them do so during the 1990s, when public budgets were 
growing. During the 1990s, revenues nearly doubled for both the U.S. government and 
for state and local governments. (See Table 1.) Yet, with two exceptions – police de-
partments across the U.S. (Weisburd, et al., 2004) and government departments in New 
York City – very few public agencies were adapting the CompStat leadership strategy 
that NYPD created in 1994.6 If revenue was the critical scarce resource, why did Per-
formanceStat (and other results-producing strategies) not flourish during the 1990s? 
Table 1: Revenues for U.S. State and Local Governments, 1990 and 2000, In Billions 
of Dollars 
 1990 2000 percent change 
State & Local Own Revenues 895 1,650 + 84% 
From Federal Government 137 291 + 112% 
Total State & Local Revenues 1,032 1,942 + 88% 
Total Federal Government Revenues 1,083 2,057 + 90% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Money may be necessary for launching a PerformanceStat leadership strategy, but it 
certainly is not sufficient. In fact, the amount of money that is necessary is not very sig-
nificant. After all, for most large public organizations, the actual financial cost is insig-
nificant. Indeed, a number of small municipalities with populations of 100,000 or less 
have created their own version of CitiStat.7 There are some up-front, capital costs for 
computers and maybe to refurbish a room for the meetings. Also, if the organization has 
little or no data related (either directly or indirectly) to performance, it may need to in-
vest in building the infrastructure necessary to collect the data that is needed to analyze 
performance – to know whether it is going up or down and why. And, of course, there 
are some ongoing, operating costs to pay for a few staff members. None of this, howev-
er, is particularly expensive. 
Once the computers have been purchased, a room has been refurbished, and the data 
collection system has been created, closing down as PerformanceStat retrieves none of 
their capital costs. It only saves the direct costs from the financial (operating) budget. It 
may, however, save some time – perhaps a lot of time – from the leadership team=s time 
budget. 
SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY OF BUDGET CUTBACKS 
When budget cuts hit, public executives have to decide which of the things that they 
have been doing they will no longer do. They will, of course, be exhorted with the uni-
versal mantra: ADo more with less@ (Caraley 1982). They have, however, already been 
through multiple iterations of this Amore with less@ contrivance, making the latest itera-
tion look a lot less feasible. And if the do-more-with-less exhortation contains no re-
lease from the storehouse of regulations about how this more must be done, the manag-
ers will lack the flexibility necessary to accomplish any more with less. 
In the private sector, executives may shed an underperforming division or cancel a line 
of uncompetitive products. As a result, they may be able to “do” more profit with less 
production. In the public sector, however, doing more with less does not always come 
with the flexibility to do less of the less useful things so that the organization can do 
more of the truly valuable things. 
Still, every public executive has a personal list of underperforming policies, programs, 
and units. If the executive could, somehow, make them disappear, performance per dol-
lar would go up. Indeed, resource cutbacks can create a number of opportunities for 
significant changes (Behn 1983). Unless the financial cutbacks are only about 1 or 2 
percent, the cutbacks require significant changes. 
After all, when faced with financial cutbacks, public executives rarely have any win-win 
options. Some programs, some units, some people will end up with less. They will not 
think they are winners. And each activity has its own dedicated constituency and vocal 
advocates. None wishes to see their cherished activity cut back to satisfy some mere 
financial problem.8 They will, to paraphrase Senator Russell Long (long the chairman of 
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the U.S. Senate Finance Committee), simply assert: ADon=t cut you, don=t cut me, cut 
that fellow behind the tree.@9 
Nevertheless, unless all units and all programs happily agree to take an across-the-
board, identical percentage, superficially fair10 cut to their budgets, someone has to 
make some choices. That might be the legislative appropriations committee; it might be 
the jurisdiction=s budget shop. It might be the leadership team of the agency itself. If 
they can make a reasonable case for their approach (if they can avoid such transparently 
obstructive tactics such as closing the Washington Monument to get tourists to com-
plain to their Representatives and Senators (Kennedy 2009)), they may find both legis-
lators and budgeteers willing to accept their proposals (and thus avoid some responsibil-
ity for the cuts). 
As always, the leadership team has to start with purpose (Behn 2010): What exactly are 
we trying to accomplish? To answer this question, the leadership team must choose. It 
has to decide on what purposes to focus (and what purposes deserve less attention). 
When budgets are expanding, such a need to focus can often be ignored; with incremen-
tal budgeting, everyone can get a little more. With decremental budgeting, however, this 
focus of purpose is essential. For purpose provides the basis for everything else. It pro-
vides the basis for identifying key performance deficits, for selecting performance tar-
gets, for designing strategies to achieve these targets, for motivating individuals and 
teams, for requesting flexibility, for justifying budget decisions. 
Budget cutbacks can always be driven by organized, vociferous, and boisterous program 
advocates. Or they can be shaped by a coherent strategy designed to achieve important 
public purposes. That such a focused strategy will curtail or eliminate under-
performing, poorly-performing, or non-performing programs, policies, and agencies 
will not escape their advocates. Now, however, the advocates may be forced to defend 
their favorites with more than noise and bodies. A focus on purpose, strategy, and tar-
gets can, if nothing else, raise the level of the budget-cutting discourse. 
WHY HAVE SO MANY PERFORMANCESTATS WITHERED? 
Yet, a number of public executives have launched their own PerformanceStat only to 
then let it shrink and fade away. Why? Why would they launch a significant initiative to 
make some visible improvements in results, only to abandon it? When creating his or 
her own PerformanceStat (and its associated performance targets), a political executive 
– whether this is an elected mayor or governor or an appointed agency head – is invest-
ing a lot of political capital. This executive is making a public commitment to improve 
performance, to produce some specific results, to hit some publicized performance tar-
gets. Having made such a public commitment, why would this executive abandon it? 
In some jurisdictions, the legislative body (which often views something like Perfor-
manceStat as a mechanism that the executive branch is using to lower the legislature=s 
power, influence, and relevance) has used the need to make budget cuts to eliminate 
whatever line items support the operations of a PerformanceStat (primarily the person-
nel slots for the PerformanceStat staff). If a PerformanceStat is not producing visible 
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results that citizens value, the legislative body can always act on this pique and defund a 
executive-branch program that it dislikes. And certainly a new executive may wish to 
eliminate the predecessor=s fancy new initiative, replacing it with his or her fancier initi-
ative. 
Still why would a public executive let his or her own fancy initiative – particularly one 
in which the executive has invested personal prestige – wither? Yet, even without the 
necessity of eliminating PerformanceStat=s small operating budget, many have, indeed, 
withered. 
Mostly, I think, those public executives who launched their own PerformanceStat failed 
to appreciate its cost to their Atime budget.@ They had made an accurate assessment of 
its cost to the Afinancial budget.@11 Drawing up a budget for the staff, the technology, 
and the room is relatively straightforward. And although there may be more uncertainty 
about the financial cost of creating the necessary data collection system, making this 
estimate is still relatively routine. But estimating how much time it would take the or-
ganization=s leadership team to run an effective PerformanceStat is an entirely different 
question. The team can visit another PerformanceStat, observe the meeting, and chat 
with agency managers, the PerformanceStat staff, and the chief executive. They will not 
(unless they devote multiple days to their site visit) observe all of the behind-the-scenes 
work necessary to make the strategy effective. 
In particular, they won=t really internalize all of the advance preparation work required 
to make each meeting effective. Thus, after holding a series of these meeting, when they 
finally appreciate how much the strategy costs their time budget, they begin to lose their 
enthusiasm. Thus they begin to postpone meetings, to cancel meetings, then to lengthen 
the time between meetings, and eventually to stop holding the meetings altogether. 
BUDGET CUTS AND THE FATE OF GMAP 
Few public executives have made a bigger public committment to their version of the 
PerformanceStat leadership strategy than did Governor Christine Gregoire of Washing-
ton State. Soon after she took office in January 2005, she launched GMAP, for Gov-
ernment Management Accountability and Performance, the first application of the Per-
formanceStat approach to an entire state government. And she didn=t just hold her 
GMAP sessions in the governor=s private conference room. She held them in a very 
large room in the state capitol; and she opened these sessions to all outsiders, including 
public employees from other agencies, citizens, and even journalists. Indeed, one re-
porter from The Olympian (the state capitol=s newspaper) even blogged about the 
GMAP discussion during the sessions. 
After a few years, however, the regularity and significance of GMAP declined. On April 
24, 2013, Gregoire=s successor as governor, Jay Inslee, closed it down. Yet well before 
then, GMAP had ceased to be consequential. Why?  
As always, there is no single explanation. In 2009, Larisa Benson, the original director 
of GMAP and perhaps its most enthusiastic and aggressive advocate within Gregoire=s 
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administration, left the governor=s staff to be the director of performance audit for the 
state=s (elected) auditor. Moreover, by this time, the recession of 2008 had already hit 
state revenues. In September 2009, the state=s Economic and Revenue Forecast Council 
reported that basic state revenues had dropped by nearly 10 percent from FY 2008 to 
FY 2009, and forecast that they would not even return to FY 2008 levels by FY 2011.12 
Any decline in revenues will get any chief executive=s attention. A 10 percent decline 
from which recovery will take several years requires serious, sustained attention. Thus 
another contributing explanation is that, even before Benson left the GMAP office, 
Governor Gregoire and her key policy advisors could not afford the time necessary to 
ensure that GMAP was effective in continuing to ratchet up agency performance. The 
task of producing results could not compete – in the allocation of their time budget – 
with the big, immediate challenge of reducing costs to match revenues. 
As a result, the Governor paid less attention to GMAP (and thus to performance). After 
all, as Herbert Simon noted, attention is a scarce resource.13 The governor could not 
afford to pay attention to both the budget crisis and performance; she had to choose. 
And she chose (as would any elected chief executive) to focus on the budget not on per-
formance. 
State agencies continued to submit their performance data to the GMAP office. But 
most of the actual GMAP meetings were cancelled. Others were replaced by electronic 
communication, with the GMAP staff reviewing the data sending back their reactions, 
comments, and suggestions. But there was no human, back-and-forth discussion of the 
problems revealed in the data, no analysis and debate of possible alternatives, no prob-
lem solving. GMAP had become little more than an internal dashboard. 
Moreover, when an agency had a problem achieving one of its established performance 
targets, it had a convenient excuse: the budget cuts. This included both the lost funding, 
which reduced resources that were originally budgeted to achieve the target, as well as 
management time which had to be shifted to manage the budget cuts. For the agencies, 
as for the governor and her staff, the cuts in their financial budgets changed how they 
allocated their time budget. 
FROM GMAP TO LEAN 
Finally, interest in GMAP waned as the governor focused on her ALean management 
initiative@ (Governor=s Office of Accountability & Performance, 2012, p. 1). In fact, in 
December 2011, Gregoire issued Executive Order 11-04 on ALean Transformation@ that, 
in part, stated: 
WHEREAS, our current economic climate with lower revenues and higher de-
mand for services requires state government to continue to streamline operational 
processes and prioritize limited resources; and . . . .  
WHEREAS, we must continue to transform government into a leaner, 21st centu-
ry organization that is more effective and efficient, and put our state on a trajecto-
ry that ensures a strong financial foundation for years to come; and . . .  
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WHEREAS, it is necessary for state agencies to take additional steps to do more 
with the resources we have available. . . . 
I . . . do hereby order and direct: 
All executive cabinet agencies to begin implementing Lean by: 
1. Learning about Lean principles, concepts and tools; 
2. Completing a Lean project by August 31, 2012; 
3. Deploying efforts to build capacity for Lean, while embedding Lean in the 
agency culture; and 
4. Reporting Lean results and lessons learned to the Governor=s Office by August 
31, 2012 (Gregoire, 2011). 
If the management and leadership challenge is to improve performance, a Perfor-
manceStat approach such as GMAP may be a valuable strategy. But if the big political 
challenge is to do more with less, then a public executive may quite rationally decide to 
focus on Lean. 
THE QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY: FOCUSING ON THE NUMERATOR OR THE 
DENOMINATOR? 
In the struggle to do more with less, Lean promises that it can do both (Womack and 
Jones, 2003). Certainly in the private sector, fewer inputs (money) that produce the 
same level and quality of outputs (products and services) will create larger outcomes 
(i.e. profits). Indeed, in the private sector, even if fewer inputs produce a lower level and 
lower quality of outputs, they still might create larger outcomes. 
After all, efficiency is a ratio – with outputs or outcomes in the numerator, and inputs in 
the denominator. 
 
Thus, the efficiency of any activity depends upon how the inputs are converted into out-
comes or outputs. 
In the public sector, however, the connection is not so obvious. After all, what is an out-
come – let alone what is a good outcome – is subject to much debate. Government can 
easily measure the inputs the same way that the private sector does: in terms of budget-
ary costs. But government does not have the agreed-upon outcome measures (return on 
equity, return on sales, operating margin) that are easy to calculate from the organiza-
tion’s financial records. Thus, when calculating the efficiency of any governmental pol-
icy, program, on agency, a lot depends upon what is considered to be an output or out-
come – what is considered to be a good output or outcome – and how it is measured. 
In addition, because this output or outcome is not recorded in government’s financial 
records, there is also the attribution problem. If there was a significantly improved out-
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put or outcome, how much of that improvement can be attributed to the work of gov-
ernment? 
Indeed, the meaning of performance for any public agency is subject to much debate. 
Does society agree on how to measure the performance of a state environmental agen-
cy? Of a county child welfare agency? Of any tax agency? Given the difficulty of meas-
uring the numerator in the efficiency ratio, most efforts at improving the efficiency in 
government focus on decreasing the denominator, for which the measure is well speci-
fied and the desired direction is open to not very much debate (Behn 2008). 
If, in the public sector, budgets are growing, public agencies may choose to focus on the 
numerator in the efficiency ratio: Use the increased resources in the denominator to 
produce even bigger increases in the numerator. But if government budgets are shrink-
ing, the focus will quickly shift to the denominator: Drive down spending to match the 
available resources. Some may try to focus the cuts on the policies, programs, and agen-
cies where the outcome impact will be the smallest. Given, however, that most of these 
will have an active constituency and allies within government, doing this may not be 
easy. While budget cuts force a decrease in the denominator of the efficiency ratio, the 
result may be an even bigger decrease in the numerator – and thus a total drop in effi-
ciency. 
THE COMPETITION FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE’S ATTENTION 
Reductions in any organization’s financial budget may well cause reductions in the or-
ganization’s performance (its outputs and outcomes). It is not obvious, however, that the 
primary causal connection will be direct – less money to spend means less that can be 
done. Instead, the bigger impact may come through the opportunity costs to the leader-
ship team’s time budget created by the financial cuts. 
For the attention that must be paid to any budget reductions (the denominator) automat-
ically reduces the attention that can be paid to performance enhancements (the numera-
tor) – and to everything else. It isn’t the money itself. It’s rather that the deficit in the 
financial budget creates another deficit: a deficit in the time budget. The financial deficit 
in the financial budget imposes an attention deficit in the time budget. Any decline in 
revenues will demand a chief executive’s attention. A 10 percent decline from which 
recovery will take several years will demand serious, sustained, time consuming atten-
tion. 
Improving the performance of any organization is a demanding undertaking – a time 
consuming undertaking. And in the public sector – where the meaning of performance 
is open to much debate – it is even more time consuming. Thus, in the public sector, the 
attention deficit imposed by the financial deficit is even bigger and more consequential. 
Robert D. Behn, Ph.D., is a lecturer at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Cambridge, Mass., USA and the author of the on-line monthly, Bob Behn’s Performance Leadership 
Report. E-mail: redsox@hks.harvard.edu 
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Thus the real challenge of improving (or even just maintaining) performance while cut-
ting financial budgets is to manage the time budget. If every budget cut needs to be pub-
licly justified, explained carefully to the injured constituency, and then fought over, the 
demands of the financial budget impose significant costs on the time budget. 
Or, to put it another way, a financial crisis increases, for any public executive’s time 
budget, the opportunity cost of exercising any form of performance leadership. 
NOTES 
 
1  For a list of sixteen leadership behaviors that are part of the PerformanceStat leader-
ship strategy, see chapter 15 (AAppreciating Leadership=s Causal Behaviors@) in Behn 
(forthcoming 2014). 
2  I have chosen to use the phrase Aperformance leadership@ to emphasize that improv-
ing performance requires the active engagement of an organization=s leadership team. 
Too often, the phrase Aperformance management@ is little more than a synonym for 
Aperformance measurement,@ suggesting (or permitting others to infer) that to meas-
ure performance is (almost automatically) to manage performance. 
3  In the United States, both the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and 
the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 did pre-
cisely this – giving the task of choosing results and measures to federal agencies. 
4  They won=t say that they are ignoring the problem. At most, they will allow that they 
can=t solve this problem until they have put in place the necessary fundamentals, or 
foundations, or other prerequisites. 
5 
The Qualitative Differences Between Incremental and Decremental Budgeting 
Incremental Budgeting Decremental Budgeting 
Is decentralized. Is centralized. 
Permits substantive decisions to be made in a 
fragmented manner. 
Requires all substantive decisions to be put into a 
comprehensive package. 
Focuses only on the increment; the base need not 
be examined. 
Requires a reexamination of the entire budget. 
Is routine and consensual. Is chaotic and conflict-laden. 
Involves negotiations and accommodation, based 
on mutual respect. 
Requires confrontation and coercion, and generates 
mistrust. 
Can be delegated to specialists and is mostly invis-
ible. 
Provokes political engagement and is very visible. 
Appears to be merely distributive. Is clearly redistributive. 
Is historical, annual, repetitive, and predictable. Is precedent-breaking, multiyear, erratic, and un-
predictable. 
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Is rewarding (for there is credit to be shared), cre-
ates stable coalitions, and thus is automatic. 
Is painful (for there is only blame to be absorbed), 
involves unstable coalitions, and thus requires 
active leadership. 
Source: Behn, 1985 
6  You might argue that public executives who were responsible for neither a police 
department nor a department in New York City=s government did not know about 
CompStat and thus could not be expected to adapt it. Yet, NYPD=s CompStat was 
well publicized. In 1996, for example, it won one of the Kennedy School=s awards 
for Innovation in American Government. 
7  These municipalities include: Palm Bay, Florida (population 100,000) with PalmStat; 
Somerville, Massachusetts (75,000) with SomerStat; Union Township, New Jersey 
(54,000) with CitiStat, and Amesbury, Massachusetts (9,000) with AmesStat. 
8  To terminate a public policy, program, or agency (or to cut its budget), arguing that it 
is not cost effective is much less politically effective than arguing that it is bad 
(Behn, 1978). 
9  Long often claimed that advocates who appeared before his Senate Finance Commit-
tee about a pending tax bill would basically say: "Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that 
fellow behind the tree!@ (Mann, 2003, p. 333). 
10  There is nothing Afair@ about across the board cuts. The organizations that get hurt the 
most are the ones that are most efficient – the ones that have already reduced the var-
ious forms of waste. The organizations that have managed to maintain excess, un-
used, or unneeded resources are more easily able, at least, to do the same amount 
with less. They have fat to cut. Across-the-board budget cuts punish the efficient. 
11  At almost every session of Baltimore=s CitiStat that I have observed, there are also 
visitor=s from other governmental jurisdictions. After the session, when the visitors 
get to ask questions of the CitiStat staff, the first question inevitably is: AHow much 
does this cost?@ By Acost,@ they mean the cost to their financial budget. They never 
ask about the cost to their time budget. 
12 
Washington State Revenues 
AGeneral Fund-State plus Related Fund@ 
FY 2008-FY 2011 
(as of September 2009) 
Fiscal Year Revenues (cash basis, billions of 
dollars) 
Percent change from 
Previous Fiscal Year 
FY 2008 (actual) $15.659 1.2% 
FY 2009 (actual) $14.154 -9.6% 
FY 2010 (forecast) $14.244 0.6% 
Source: Economic and Revenue Forecast Council, Washington State Economic and Revenue Forecast, 
vol. 23, no. 3 (September 2009), p. 73. 
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13  AIn a world where attention is a major scarce resource, information may be an expen-
sive luxury, for it may turn our attention from what is important to what is unim-
portant. . . . Some of the practical consequences of attention scarcity have already 
been noticed in business and government, where early designs of so-called >manage-
ment information systems= flooded executives with trivial data and, until they learned 
to ignore them, distracted their attention from more important matters.@ (Simon 1978, 
p. 13). 
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